Michael Perry, Peter Singer, and Quasimodo: Persons With Disabilities and the Nature of Rights by Wright, R. George
MICHAEL PERRY, PETER SINGER, AND
QUASIMODO: PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES AND
THE NATURE OF RIGHTS
R. George Wright
Michael Perry's The Idea of Human Rights' raises important
and difficult issues. One such issue, reformulated, is whether the
latter half of the twentieth century has witnessed both the rise of
human rights language in international law, and the erosion, if not the
collapse, in the intellectual sphere of the theoretical underpinnings of
human rights as traditionally understood. This is part of a broader
tension, in which the advance of broadly liberal values has coexisted
with increasing skepticism about the objectivity of ethics,2 freedom
of the will3 and genuine moral responsibility,4 meaningfulness in a
natural order,5 and the irreducibility of mind.6
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1. Michael J. Perry, The Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries (Oxford U
Press, 1998). Further references to this text will generally be by page number.
2. As mere examples drawn from a broad range of currently popular non-
objectivist metaethical stances, see Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism
(Oxford U Press, 1993); Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Harv U Press,
1990); Allan Gibbard, Normative Objectivity 19 Nous 41 (1985); John L. Mackie,
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin, 1977); Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics
and Language (Yale U Press, 1944). For a survey of common criticisms of the
idea of moral objectivity, see Alan Gilbert, Democratic Individuality ch 2
(Cambridge U Press 1990). For an interesting recent response, see Eric
Blumenson, Mapping The Limits of Skepticism in Law and Morals 74 Tex L Rev
523 (1996). For discussion of the erosion of the objectivist paradigm of human
rights, see Ruti Teitel, Human Rights Genealogy 66 Fordham L Rev 301, 304-05,
312(1997).
3. See, for example, Richard Double, The Non-Reality of Free Will (Oxford U
Press, 1991); Richard Double, Metaphilosophy and Free Will (Oxford U Press,
1996); Ted Honderich, A Theory of Determinism: The Mind, Neuroscience, and
Life-Hopes (Oxford U Press, 1988); Ted Honderich, How Free Are You? (Oxford U
Press, 1993); Michael Slote, Ethics Without Free Will 16 Soc Theory & Practice
369 (1990).
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Perry raises the question of the intelligibility.7 Of course, this
strategy offers no general guarantees. Whether a familiar idea is
coherent or intelligible can in some cases be subject to prolonged,
subtle dispute. And sometimes an arguably intelligible moral idea is
uncontroversially implausible or disastrous, such that it is easier to
indict the recommendation on its evident bad consequences, rather
than worry about its possible unintelligibility. Perhaps it could even
be said that any moral belief that is or should be ultimately
recognized by its holder as morally unacceptable is in some sense
unintelligible. In any event, we shall focus below mainly on possible
or likely consequences of the gradual dissipation of the idea of
human rights in Perry's sense and of the idea of the objectivity of
morality in general.' Perry concludes that
There is no intelligible (much less persuasive) secular version of
the conviction that every human being is sacred; the only
4. See, for example, Galen Strawson, The Impossibility of Moral
Responsibility 75 Phil Stud 5 (1994).
5. See, for example, Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
(Princeton U Press, 1979); Quentin Smith, A Natural Explanation of the Existence
and Laws of Our Universe 68 Australasian J Phil 22 (1990). See also Jean-Paul
Sarre, Being and Nothingness (Methuen, Hazel E. Barnes, Trans, 1966).
6. For general discussion, see, for example, Paul M. Churchland, Matter and
Consciousness (MIT Press, 1984); Daniel Dennett, Brainstorms (MIT Press, 1978);
Stephen C. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against
Belief (Harvester Press, 1983). See also B.F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and
Dignity (Knopf, 1971).
7. Perry uses the idea of intelligibility, and of inescapability and
ineliminability as well. See Perry, Human Rights at 5 (cited in note 1). The
intended contrast is with such ideas as persuasiveness and even mere plausibility on
the one hand, and perhaps with mere avoidance of patent self-contradiction or
facial internal inconsistency on the other. The idea of the (merely) conceivable or
the narrowly coherent may be synonymous with intelligibility in Perry's sense, or
may be weaker.
In any event, Perry's use of the idea of intelligibility seems intended, at
least in part, to reach a broad, general result, and to bypass unnecessary
complications, including any need to predict future events at a cultural level, or to
controversially evaluate past events. The idea seems roughly that if we can show
the unintelligibility of, say, a married bachelor, we need not worry about new
instances or new variations on the theme within the scope of that concept, and we
need not debate historical instances, send out search parties, or await potentially
surprising future events.
8. Idatll-12.
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intelligible versions are religious. (To say that the only
intelligible versions of the conviction are religious is not to say
that any religious version is persuasive or even plausible). The
conviction that every human being is sacred is, in my view,
inescapably religious-and the idea of human rights is, therefore,
ineliminably religious. 9
To this, there are at least four interesting possible responses,
only one of which we shall pursue herein. First, one can deny that
there are any intelligible religious versions of the idea of human
rights, leaving open the issue of whether any secular versions are any
more intelligible. Second, one can reassert the intelligibility of
secular human rights claims, perhaps through redefining one or more
of the ideas of rights, human rights, religion, sacredness or
inviolability, or intelligibility." Third, one could accept Perry's
conclusion or some variant thereof and, given one's strong
commitment to human rights, be therefore prompted to reexamine the
adequacy of a thoroughly secular understanding of the moral or
natural world." The fourth possibility, with which we shall herein be
9. Id.
10. For reference, consider Peter Singer, Applied Ethics 84 (Oxford U Press, 2d
ed, 1993) ("We may take the doctrine of the sanctity of human life to be no more
than a way of saying that human life has some special value, a value quite distinct
from the value of the lives of other living things"). It is remarkably common for
theorists to reject an idea as standardly defined, but to nonetheless continue using
the same terminology for their new, much attenuated replacement version of the
idea, on the grounds that the replacement notion is all that is realistically available,
or all that is worth wanting. When crudely employed, this can involve trading
illicitly, if unconsciously, on the favorable associations of the assumedly now
obsolete version of the concept. In contrast, for a thoughtful and sophisticated
instance, see Daniel C. Dennett, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth
Wanting (MIT Press, 1984).
11. This would be at least vaguely akin to accepting what is traditionally
known as a moral argument for the existence of God. See, for example, Robert M.
Adams, The Virtue of Faith ch 10 (Clarendon Press, 1987); Richard Swinburne,
The Existence of God 175-76 (Oxford U Press, 1979); Keith Ward, God, Chance
and Necessity 90 (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996). See also John Leslie, Value and
Existence (Rowman & Littlefield, 1979); John Leslie, Universes ch 8 (Routledge,
1989). A further step for anyone considering taking the argument in this direction
might be to then take some position on the familiar "problem of evil." See, for
example, Daniel Howard-Snyder, ed, The Evidential Argument From Evil (Ind U
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concerned, also involves accepting Perry's conclusion or something
like it. This response, however, is to choose to retain one's exclusive
commitment to the secular, and to therefore abandon the idea of
human rights as Perry understands the term.
Important intellectual trends, as we have already suggested,
underlie such a response. If one has already come to doubt any
meaningfulness in nature, moral objectivity, free will, mind, and
responsibility, it will hardly seem a significant further step to jettison
traditional understandings of human rights. The step involved is
mainly that of incurring a psychological, or perhaps a political, cost.
Alone of all these gradually evaporating ideas, only the idea of
human rights is still fairly widely associated with political
progressivism.
In a strictly logical sense, abandoning the traditional idea of
human rights is actually no further step at all, but is instead already
contained within the broader abandonment of moral objectivity in
general.' One could, no doubt, redefine the idea of a human right so
as to be able to speak of human rights even in the absence of any
assumed objectivity of morals. But the thinner the metaethics, the
less room there can be for human rights as traditionally conceived.
A question of crucial practical importance then arises: what
happens, over the long-term, when we back away from any idea of
objectivity of morality in general and of objective human rights in
particular? Would the general demise of belief in any objectivity of
morals over time have significant consequences for particular groups,
or for society in general? Would the least well off groups likely
suffer disproportionately? This is, unfortunately, a complex question
involving predictive matters of culture, history, psychology,
Press, 1996); Marilyn McCord Adams & Robert Merrihew Adams, eds, The
Problem of Evil (Oxford U Press, 1990).
12. Michael Perry recognizes at 5 that "[w]hile the idea of human rights is not,
for those who accept it, the whole of morality, it is a fundamental part." Also see
id at 28. We shall assume that traditionally, and in international law, human rights
claims are thought to be morally objective in character. It is certainly possible to
develop, say, an emotivist or attitude expressive and prescriptive approach to
human rights, however compelling or otherwise such usages might be. We shall
leave it to the emotivist theorist of human rights to decide whether it is disturbing
that such human rights usages might inescapably express, by implication, religious
beliefs or presuppositions.
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socialization, evolutionary biology, law, and any number of other
disciplines all mutually interacting over time. It is also one on the
answer to which our own society appears currently to be placing a
bet. Perhaps the gradual abandonment of moral objectivity and of
human rights in particular will prove liberating.' 3 Perhaps it will
eventually turn out to simply not matter very much.'4 Perhaps, on the
other hand, things will turn out unattractively, at least from any
current progressive standpoint. 5
Perry addresses these concerns throughout the first chapter of
The Idea of Human Rights. Human rights, as traditionally
understood, reflect some presumably shared attribute of human
beings. 6 While it is possible to refer to this attribute as an aspect of
the human personality, 7 the relevant aspect is not so much a matter
of psychology as of ascribed worth, based on the nature and status of
the human in a deeply or ultimately meaningful world.'
Whether the world provides this sort of ultimate meaning, or
whether we must make do with such meaning as we can ourselves
construct, is central to philosophical concern since the
Enlightenment. Perry formulates the question in these terms:
Am I indeed an alien, an exile, homeless, in a world, a universe,
that is strange, hostile, pointless, absurd? Or, instead, is the
world, finally and radically, familiar, even gracious; does the
world have a point, is it a project; is the world, in that sense,
meaningful: meaning-full, full of meaning rather than bereft of it
(and therefore meaning-less, absurd)? 9
Perry recognizes, of course, that meaning, and even
meaningfulness in a life, can in some sense be constructed, even
more or less arbitrarily. Some persons, at the extreme, live and die
13. See, for example, Richard Rorty, Postmodernist Bourgeoise Liberalism 80
J Phil 583 (1983).
14. See, for example, Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity in
Robert P. George, ed, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays 158 (Oxford U
Press, 1992).
15. See, for example, R. George Wright, Reason and Obligation ch 5 (U Press
of America, 1994).
16. Perry, Human Rights at 12, 13 (cited in note 1).
17. Idat 12.
18. Idat 12-15.
19. Id at I (italics in the original).
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with a particular sports team with whom they may have only the most
tenuous of geographical connections.20 But Perry detects a difference
between a morality that somehow finds ultimate meaning in the
world, and a morality that seeks to invent and impute such meaning,
or its facsimile.2 Perry refers to the former as conceiving of life's
meaning in a strong or objective sense.22
Is it possible, though, to adequately defend the substance of
human rights injunctions without relying on the idea of strong or
objective meaningfulness? Perry considers two kinds of attempts to
accomplish this. These he refers to respectively as the definitional
strategy 23 and the self-regarding strategy. 24 In Perry's view, neither
of these two attempts is successful.
The definitional strategy seeks to arrive at, and sufficiently
validate, human rights claims through a proper understanding of the
bare idea of morality itself. On this view, morality itself implies, or
logically requires, the ideas of impartiality, of universality, and of
equality of concern and respect. 5 To count merely some, but not
others, and to care about some, but not others, is not to endorse a
narrow morality, but to fail to embrace morality at all. Perry argues
in response that this approach fails to address the question of why
one should embrace the moral point of view in the first place.26 Once
one's metaphysics becomes too thin, embracing universal, impartial
morality, as opposed to the interests of only one's own group, seems
arbitrary.27 Perry urges that "[t]he moral point of view is itself in
direct need of justification, especially in a world-our world, the real
world-that is often fiercely partial/local rather than impartial/
universal. 2 1
20. One thinks first of English soccer hooligans, but one could also think of
more proximate, and thankfully more socially benign, such cases.
21. Idat29.
22. Id.
23. Perry, Human Rights at 29-30.
24. Id at 32-33.
25. Idat30.
26. Id.
27. Id at 31. Of course, it would be odd to ask for a moral reason for
embracing morality, but it hardly seems odd to ask for a justification grounded in
broadly prudential or other forms of reason.
28. Id at 31 (italics in the original).
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The self-regarding strategy seeks to arrive at the substance of
human rights claims indirectly. The idea is that it is good for one's
self or one's group that certain things be done or not done for or to
every human being.29 Perry argues in response that this approach
partakes more of a non-aggression pact among potential mutual
threateners than an adequate ground for any universal morality.3
Realistically, there is little reason to suppose that we will some day
need the cooperation or the forbearance of either the victims or the
perpetrators of human rights violations in, say, the Balkans." Perry
observes further that "even if you live among us but are, say, severely
handicapped, we might not think that you have anything to offer
us."32 Perry concludes that the self-regarding strategy is no more
successful than the definitional strategy in finessing the question of
human rights and their reliance on an objectively, ultimately
meaningful world.
Perry thus concludes more broadly that the adequate intellectual
defense of human rights, if one is possible, requires belief in an
objective moral order and an ultimately meaningful world. This,
Perry hastens to note, does not mean that it is somehow impossible or
inconsistent to deny objective morality and yet vigorously defend the
human rights of some, indeed all, other persons.33 But this admitted
possibility still leaves open questions of motivation and of
consistency. Institutions, including that of human rights, do not
survive merely because it is possible to believe in them, or because
different sorts of persons currently do so believe. Perry recognizes
that some writers, such as Richard Rorty, have been led by their
distrust of objectivist metaethics to simply reject the idea of human
rights in its traditional sense. 4 Perry asks in contrast whether it
seems responsible to defend human rights, perhaps through killing
and dying, based merely on our own sentiments, preferences, stories,
29. Perry, Human Rights at 32 (cited in note 1).
30. Id.
31. Id at 33.
32. Id.
33. Id at 35.
34. Id at 37-38 (citing Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and
Sentimentality in Steven Shute & Susan Hurley, eds, On Human Rights: The
Oxford Amnesty Lectures 116 (1993)).
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and conventions apart from purportedly objective, transcultural
grounds.35
The consequences of abandoning the standard logic of human
rights, along with all other purportedly objective moral claims, is of
concern to Perry, and should plainly be of concern to us all. As
philosophers tend toward abandoning the idea of human rights and
objective morality more generally,36 the question may well become
less purely academic, and may eventually come to impinge upon
political and legal practice."
Rather than attempt to address this question in global fashion,
let us more manageably consider it from a single, narrower
perspective where important values are directly at stake and in which
our intuitions are widely shared and fairly clear. Specifically, let us
consider what happens when we collectively back away from
putatively objective human rights claims,, or other putatively
objective moral claims, regarding persons with disabilities. s
One might conceivably object to this approach on the grounds
that the relevant rights of persons with disabilities cannot technically
be human rights, but only rights of those humans, more narrowly,
with disabilities. Admittedly, there does seem to be some difference
between the rights of persons with disabilities, precisely in that
capacity, and, let us say, a broader human right to a name, or to
food.39 It would be artificial at best to say that the latter rights pertain
35. Perry, Human Rights at 37-39 (cited in note 1).
36. For discussion, see, for example, Susan Mendus, Human Rights in Political
Theory 43 Pol Studies 10, 10-11, 14 (1995).
37. Idat 17.
38. Perry explicitly raises the question of the moral status of severely disabled
persons, and other persons having little with which to bargain or threaten, at 33.
He also briefly refers to "abandonment of small children" at 22, a subject we shall
touch upon below in connection with our discussion of the views of Peter Singer.
39. For an extended discussion of subsistence rights, see Henry Shue, Basic
Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy (Princeton U Press, 2d ed,
1996). For a relevant international legal reference to the right to a name, see Albert
P. Blaustein, Roger S. Clark & Jay A. Sigler, eds, Human Rights Sourcebook 202,
203 (Paragon House, 1987) (quoting Principle 3 of the Declaration of the Rights of
the Child (1959), G.A. Res. 1386 (14), 14 G.A.O.R. Supp (no 16) at 19, UN Doc
A/4354 (1959) ("The child shall be entitled from his birth to a name and a
nationality")). For references to the international legal rights of persons with
disabilities, see id at 217-18 (quoting Declaration on the Rights of Disabled
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only to humans who do not have a name, or who need food, and not
to humans generally. As well, it is doubtful that every moral right we
ascribe to a disabled person, in just that capacity, will itself amount to
a human right. A disabled person in an advanced economy may have
a moral right to access to something like a kneeling bus, but whether
this moral right must also be thought of as a human right is at least
debatable. 0
On the other hand, certain moral rights held by disabled
persons, precisely as disabled persons, clearly qualify as putative
human rights. Whatever one thinks about the merits of such claims,
or about the status or value of human rights in general, an asserted
right not to be suffocated, abandoned, publicly flogged, or denied all
available employment because one is disabled is a claim within the
scope of human rights. To hold otherwise would disregard the
traditional understanding of the scope of human rights, and disqualify
uncontroversially central human rights claims. Clearly, human rights
can be violated through acts that aim not only at what all humans
currently share, but essentially at one's particular disfavored ethnic
status, religion, gender, and so on. Michael Perry describes, for
example, human rights violations aimed explicitly at particular sorts
of persons, as that sort of person, as in the case of Serbian atrocities
against Moslems or Moslem women.4' Such actions are not thereby
removed from the scope of putative human rights violations.
How, then, does the gradual ebbing of the idea of moral
objectivity, and of human rights in particular, work itself out in
practice in the case of persons with disabilities? Overall, the best
theoretical exemplar of this process may be the work of the applied
moral philosopher Peter Singer. Singer thus may provide the most
useful response, in our context, to the work of Michael Perry. Singer
is a leading academic philosopher who has addressed issues of
metaethics, of the possibility and scope of moral and legal rights of
Persons (1975), G.A. Res. 3477 (30), 30 UN Doc A/10034 (1975) ("Disabled
persons have the inherent right to respect for their human dignity"). ("Disabled
persons are entitled to the measures designed to become as self-reliant as
possible")).
40. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 USCA § 12101 (West,
1995) affects such public accommodations. Id at § 12182.
41. Perry, Human Rights at 28 (cited in note 1).
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disabled persons, of normative ethics in general, and of practical
problems associated with his own metaethical and normative views.42
His work is particularly useful for several reasons. First, he is
sympathetic to the interests of disabled jobseekers,43 so his views
cannot be simply dismissed as irrelevant, marginal, and
unilluminating. Second, he endorses positions that set our particular
inquiry in motion. He takes a position diametrically opposed to Perry
in that he entirely sets aside any sort of religious element in ethics, at
either the metaethical or normative levels." He entirely rejects the
idea of moral objectivity in ethics,4" in favor of some form of moral
noncognitivism," a mainstream contemporary metaethical position.47
At the normative ethical level, he endorses a particular form of
utilitarianism,48 and again contrary to Perry, rejects the idea of moral
rights in general and human rights in particular,49 though here with
certain qualifications."0 Third and finally, Singer writes with
exceptional clarity, candor, subtlety, and with unusual attention to
problems of practical implementation. Even where it is possible to
criticize Singer for seeking to finesse, rather than resolve, an
unattractive implication of his views, Singer is open and forthright
42. Professor Singer is an exceptionally prolific scholar, but the single most
convenient and comprehensive treatment of all of these matters can be found in
Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge U Press, 2d ed, 1993).
43. Id at 52-53.
44. Id at Introduction.
45. Idat 7-8.
46. Id.
47. See, for example, Gibbard, Wise Choices (cited in note 2); Charles L.
Stevenson, Ethics and Language (Yale U Press, 1944).
48. Singer, Practical Ethics at ch 1, 94 (cited in note 42).
49. Id at ch 1, 94, 96. Singer is perhaps best known for his concern for persons
as opposed to genetic human beings. This is of course important in some contexts,
but not in ours. Michael Perry generally adopts the standard moral and legal
terminology of "human" rights.
50. Id at 172. Arguably, a utilitarian must rely on some sort of rights
conception in establishing who or what counts, and for how much, for utilitarian
purposes; one cannot answer these questions by reference to maximizing utility
without begging the question. And at various points, as we shall see, Singer is
tempted to adopt something that looks like a moral right, even if this remains
outside his "ideal" theory, for the sake of avoiding possible bad consequences of
trying under less than ideal circumstances to implement a purer preference
utilitarian theory. See, for example, id.
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about his strategy. His work thus provides a useful foil for Perry and
an excellent case study for our purposes.
Let us first establish Singer's views on disability in the narrow
context of job discrimination and access to public accommodations.
Here, Singer's preferred outcomes track the logic of statutes such as
the Americans with Disabilities Act"' and the Rehabilitation Act.5 2
Singer endorses a principle of nondiscrimination 3 against disabled
persons on grounds not deemed relevant 54 to the job or service at
issue. Which sorts of disabilities are genuinely relevant to which
particular jobs is sometimes controversial, 5 but Singer clearly
empathizes with disabled jobseekers.56
Singer refers to discrimination against disabled persons in terms
of a "confusion" between "factual equality" and "moral equality."57
He may mean here that the distinction between disability and non-
disability implies some sort of factual inequality, but not moral
inequality, between persons. His point may thus be that some forms
of factual inequality may be relevant to an applicant's job
qualifications, whereas others will not, and that we should not
devalue or undercount the real interests of persons with disabilities. 8
51. See generally the Americans with Disabilities Act (cited in note 40).
52. See generally the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 USCA § 701 (West, 1985
& Supp 1998).
53. Singer, Practical Ethics at 52 (cited in note 42).
54. Id at 52, 53.
55. Distinguishing between a person with a disability who could perform the
job with reasonable accommodation and a person whose disability renders her
unqualified is often a crucial determination. For discussion, see, for example, Den
Hartog v Wasatch Acad., 129 F3d 1076 (1997); Vande Zande v State of Wisc, 44
F3d 538 (1995).
56. Singer, Practical Ethics at 52 (cited in note 42) ("Even today, some
businesses will not hire a person in a wheelchair for a job that she could do as well
as anyone else. Others seeking a salesperson will not hire someone whose
appearance is abnormal, for fear that sales will fall. (Similar arguments were used
against employing members of racial minorities; we can best overcome such
prejudices by becoming used to people who are different from us.")).
57. Id.
58. Casual references to an applicant's ability to do a job, with or without
reasonable accommodations, of course need to be clarified in some fashion.
Qualifications are always relative to those of possible competing applicants, or to
automating the work process, and refer not to the mere ability to do certain physical
or mental tasks, but to do them with a certain degree of success, or with a certain
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Singer's argument is then that equal membership in the
community, and the broader underlying principle of equal
consideration of the interests of disabled persons, require not mere
equality of opportunity, 9 but "affirmative action"" in favor of
disabled persons. Actually, this conclusion seems mainly a matter of
preferred terminology. Singer's distinction here depends upon a thin,
formalistic view of equality of opportunity, under which physically
denying access to public accommodations6" and denying placement
in mainstream classes62 is somehow assumed to be compatible with
equal opportunity, hence requiring "affirmative action" as a
remedy.63
In any event, Singer concludes that more should be spent, 64 in
general, for the benefit of people with disabilities in these contexts
than on non-disabled persons. This is said to follow from a general
moral decisionmaking process of empathetically identifying with and
considering 65 the interests of all affected persons equally. 66  This
corresponds to what Michael Perry refers to as the definitional
strategy. The needs of the disabled should evoke more resources,
even on the basis of (merely) equal consideration of their interests,
because the relevant needs67 of the disabled will often be "very
error rate, or within a certain time, based on a certain degree of employer
investment and supervision, all as translated into something like employee
productivity, profit maximization, or avoidance of company bankruptcy. Id.
59. Idat 53.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Singer, Practical Ethics at 53 (cited in note 42).
64. At some point, of course, a decision must be made as to which of these
costs should be borne by the taxpayers, and which by employers or facility owners,
perhaps to be partially or completely passed along to customers or users.
65. Id.
66. Id. For a sampling of recent discussions of the possibility or the proper
scope of the general redistribution of resources in favor of persons with disabilities,
see Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2. Equality of Resources 10 Phil &
Pub Aff 283, 296, 300, 339 (1981); Gregory S. Kavka, Disability and the Right to
Work 9 Soc Phil & Pol'y 262 (1992); Jeff McMahon, Cognitive Disability,
Misfortune, and Justice 25 Phil & Pub Aff 3 (1996); David Wasserman, Disability,
Discrimination, and Fairness 13 Phil & Pub Pol'y 7 (1993).
67. Singer, Practical Ethics at 53 (cited in note 42).
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central"68 to their lives, and will therefore receive "much greater
weight than more minor needs of others."69  This is certainly
plausible on any utilitarian, and many nonutilitarian, theories.
Singer's use of the idea of something's being "central" to a life need
not trouble us. Doubtless something can be 'central' to a life in a
utilitarian sense, but different sorts of philosophers may address the
idea of centrality in different ways.
Having introduced Singer's general approach to the rights of
disabled persons, let us consider, for the sake of concreteness, the
particular case of Victor Hugo's Quasimodo.7° The concreteness of
such an inquiry has certain virtues. Hugo writes that "Quasimodo,
one-eyed, hunchbacked, and bowlegged, could hardly be considered
as anything more than almost."'" Whether any given philosophical
approach treats Quasimodo as more than an "almost" is, we may
suggest, an important test. Certainly, the major Parisian political and
religious institutions, along with the general Parisian populace, treat
him as an almost. How far we have come, however, from late
medieval Paris is occasionally subject to question. There are
certainly contemporary horror stories to tell of the treatment of
persons with disabilities.72
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Textual references will be to Victor Hugo, The Hunchback of Notre Dame
(Signet Penguin, Walter J. Cobb & Phyllis La Farge, Trans, 1965).
71. Id at 147-48 (italics in the original).
72. Erving Goffman, for example, recounts second hand:
I remember ... a man at an open-air restaurant in Oslo. He was much
disabled, and he had left his wheel-chair to ascend a rather steep
staircase up to the terrace where the tables were. Because he could
not use his legs he had to crawl on his knees, and as he began to
ascend the stairs in this unconventional way, the waiters rushed to
meet him, not to help, but to tell him that they could not serve a man
like him at that restaurant, as people visited it to enjoy themselves and
have a good time, not to be depressed by the sight of cripples.
Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes On the Management of Spoiled Identity 120
(Simon & Schuster, 1986). Or consider an even more recent example, occurring in
the US, two months after the effective date of the ADA's public accommodations
section:
"[J]oumalist John Hockenberry.. . .had paid $60 for his ticket and had
checked in advance that the theater was accessible. But when he
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Quasimodo certainly fares reasonably well on Singer's
approach, insofar as he applies for employment as a bellringer, or
seeks to use public accommodations. Whether Quasimodo fares
equally well in other contexts, based on Singer's principle of equal
consideration of interests, is, however, open to greater doubt, as we
shall see below. Ultimately, Michael Perry's approach corresponds
more closely with our considered judgments on the moral
decisionmaking process than does that of Peter Singer, even granting
the subtlety of the latter.
Consider first the young version of the congenitally deformed
and parentally abandoned Quasimodo. He is described by one
observer as "a beast, an animal-the offspring of a Jew and a sow-
something, at any rate, which is not Christian, and which must be
thrown into the river or fire."7  Quasimodo's "head was so
deformed! It was nothing but a forest of red hair, one eye, a mouth,
and a few teeth. The eye was weeping; the mouth was crying; and
the teeth seemed to want only to bite." 4 He "was born one-eyed,
hunchbacked, and lame."75
Of course, consigning the young Quasimodo to the river or fire
was not a unanimous public recommendation. Among his mixed
reviews were these:
'What is the world coming to,' said Jehanne, 'if that's the way
they make children nowadays?'
'I don't know much about children,' resumed Agnes, 'but it must
be a sin to look at this one.'
'It's not a child at all, Agnes. It's a deformed ape,' observed
Gauchre.
showed up, the theater manager refused to help seat him. 'You are a
fire hazard, sir,' the manager complained."
Joseph P. Shapiro, No Pity: People With Disabilities Forging a New Civil Rights
Movement 331 (Times Books, 1994). The odd combination here of formality or
superficial politeness of address with the suggestively un-Kantian content-"You
are a fire hazard"--reveals much of our continuing ambivalence toward persons
with disabilities.
73. Hugo, Hunchback at 140 (cited in note 70).
74. Idat 141.
75. Id at 142. While Quasimodo had "much difficulty" learning to speak in
any event, his deafness arose later, only as a result of his close exposure to the bells
of Notre Dame. See id at 149-50.
[Vol XIV
113] MICHAEL PERRY, PETER SINGER, & QUASIMODO 127
'It's a miracle,' said Henriette la Gaultire. 76
The overall public sentiment, however, seems reasonably clear.
Quasimodo, at least at the time of his exposure for possible adoption
or at some even earlier time, may well be profoundly vulnerable on
any straightforward utilitarian calculus.
For his part, Peter Singer correctly observes that "[a] week-old
baby is not a rational and self-conscious being, and there are many
nonhuman animals whose rationality, self-consciousness, awareness,
capacity to feel, and so on, exceed that of a human baby a week or a
month old., 77 Singer elaborates:
Newborn babies cannot see themselves as beings who might or
might not have a future, and so cannot have a desire to continue
living.78 For the same reason, if a right to life must be based on
the capacity to want to go on living, or on the ability to see
oneself as a continuing mental subject, a newborn baby cannot
have a right to life. Finally, a newborn baby is not an
autonomous being, capable of making choices, and so to kill a
newborn baby cannot violate the principle of respect for
autonomy.79
76. Id at 140. Thus while the clear majority seem to find this "pretended
orphan" to be demonic, deserving of the flames, and otherwise fated for "the
greatest calamities," at least one person steps forward to adopt the foundling. Id at
142.
77. Singer, Practical Ethics at 169 (cited in note 42).
78. Actually, this may underplay the reality of what might be called instinctive
desires. More exotically, let us assume that it is physically possible for beings to
live in and be aware of different numbers of physical dimensions and, less
controversially, that I can no more imagine what it would be like to exist in
different numbers of dimensions than an infant can imagine her own death or
nonexistence. Isn't there still a real sense in which I might desire to remain in what
appears to be my familiar four dimensional space-time manifold rather than be
somehow promoted to an admittedly utterly unenvisionable, if somehow less
constrained, higher dimensional existence? Not all desires, it would seem, imply a
current state of affairs and an imaginable alternative. As it turns out, our actual
dimensional status is currently under some professional uncertainty. See, for
example, John D. Barrow, Theories of Everything 101 (Oxford U Press, 1991)
(string theory as, on some versions, predicting up to 22 additional spatial
dimensions).
79. Singer, Practical Ethics at 171 (cited in note 42). For Singer's own more
nuanced approach to different sorts of principles of autonomy, see id at 100.
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We are, of course, interested in the possible disposition of
Quasimodo beyond newborn status. It is open to Michael Perry to
ask whether the month old child is "neighbor." Extending in time the
autonomy test cited by Singer is a matter of cognitive developmental
psychology. Singer thus observes quite sensibly that
It would, of course, be difficult to say at what age children begin
to see themselves as distinct entities existing over time. Even
when we talk with two or three year old children it is usually
very difficult to elicit any coherent conception of death, or of the
possibility that ... the child herself ... might cease to exist. No
doubt children vary greatly in the age at which they begin to
understand these matters. 0
On Singer's own form of utilitarianism, which focuses on equal
consideration of the interests or preferences of all affected parties,
there can really be no directly arrived at, straightforward prohibition
on the killing of children or adults.8 Even if Singer can reach the
right result, we must ask whether Michael Perry can do so in a less ad
hoc fashion.
Singer must first offer some convincing general account of
what sorts of things count, and for how much, in the utilitarian
calculus. Why do plans, interests, projects, or even preferences and
desires count directly at all, to the extent they are not reducible to
feelings of some sort of pleasure or pain? Does a distinct self-
consciousness or self-awareness count along with, if not more than,
sensations or memories of pleasure or pain? Why doesn't Singer's
approach in this respect embody, ironically, a kind of speciesist or
cognitivist bias, reflecting distinctively personal attributes, at the
obvious, systematic expense of animals? Is this perhaps just a
vestige of some sort of discredited traditional hierarchy of being?
80. Id at 17i. One disturbing element of the view discussed by Singer at this
point is the possibility that a young child's right to continue to live might depend
upon the degree to which she has benefited from, or been denied, a cognitively
stimulating upbringing. A child with a philosophical, or perhaps merely morose,
caregiver might acquire a right to life relatively early, and a relevantly deprived
child only much later. In the worst cases, the existence or not of a right to continue
to live would directly reflect parental wealth and poverty.
81. Id at 172-73. For a concise critique of utilitarianism generally along these
lines, see, for example, James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights 92-93 (U
Cal Press, 1987).,
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Let us consider a specific example. Does a human's 80 utiles
of long-term project fulfillment outweigh 100 utiles of a non-human
animal's mere physical pain? Is Singer just arbitrarily exalting the
moral status of what his readers are good at? No doubt we negatively
value the frustration of our plans. The term 'frustration,' however, is
deeply ambiguous. Sometimes frustration, in a broad sense, is not
even felt or experienced. Why should any utilitarian care about
frustration in any sense, except insofar as someone's broadly defined
pleasure or pain is somehow affected? It is admittedly possible for
someone to find pain undesirable, or perhaps even desirable, and thus
to evaluate or react to pain or pleasure. But these sorts of desires
merely re-raise the question-are they in turn based on some sort of
more basic conscious pain or pleasure, or some other conscious state?
It is hard to see why a 'frustration' of one's plans that is never sensed
or brought to awareness, and that has no emotional effect, should
count, at least directly, on any utilitarian calculus.
Let us simply assume nonetheless that Singer, as a preference
utilitarian, has developed a fully defensible general account of what
should and should not count for utilitarian decisionmaking. What
should Singer then say in particular of disabled or deformed and
widely unappealing children, including Quasimodo? Are they to be
embraced within Michael Perry's universal fraternity? Let us
suppose first that the death of Quasimodo at a point during his first
several years of life would likely have causally led to the birth of a"replacement" child without Quasimodo's deformities, and with
much greater appeal to the child's parents and to the public in
general.8 2 What does the weighting and summation of the various
relevant interests, preferences, and desires suggest as a permissible, if
not mandatory, course regarding Quasimodo?
We can easily imagine a scenario in which there is no parental
or other family interest favoring Quasimodo's continued existence,
and in which the general public finds him repugnant, fear-inducing,
burdensome, or demonic. For at least the first several years of his
life, Quasimodo may have had no grasp of his own mortality, no
long-term projects, no aspirations, no social relationships, and a net
. 82. Singer raises the idea of such cases, and briefly discusses them in Practical
Ethics at 186 (cited in note 42).
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balance of pain and conscious frustration over enjoyment. Especially
when we add in the assumed better prospects of a "replacement"83
child, we can well imagine a utilitarian calculus that permits, if it
does not require, the appropriately carried out death of Quasimodo.
Singer rightly insists that we cannot reach such conclusions
casually, or without substantial qualification. He notes that "infants
appeal to us because they are small and helpless, and there are no
doubt very good evolutionary reasons why we should feel protective
towards them."84  Quasimodo, of course, generally fails to inspire
affection, given his unappealing appearance, whatever his size and
degree of helplessness.85 Evolutionary tendencies commonly do little
to counteract cultural practices that clearly underprotect the basic
interests of children. 86
83. We are of course assuming here that for purposes of the relevant moral
calculus, it is possible that one person, whether of finite or infinite moral
importance, can "replace" another. This would be akin to a process of removing
one complicated term from a mathematical equation, and substituting another.
84. Id at 170.
85. If smallness of size and helplessness were the only factors at work here,
organizations concerned with endangered species would emphasize their
associations with scarce endangered bugs, rather than Giant Pandas.
86. See, for example, Robert Wright, The Moral Animal: Evolutionary
Psychology and Everyday Life 104 (Pantheon Books, 1994). Doubtless there are
reasonably interesting evolutionary explanations for virtually all common behavior,
moral and immoral, and for their opposites. No doubt some explanation could be
given in terms of genetic survival advantage for self-consciousness, or our ability
to deploy quantum mechanics. Unfortunately, this genetic winnowing process does
not seem to lead to entirely satisfactory results. The behavior, for example, of non-
custodial fathers with child support obligations tends to vary remarkably and may
not be improving over time. More generally, it is difficult to believe that
evolutionary forces and moral principle counsel the same tradeoffs among the
interests of one's self, close relatives, non-relatives, and strangers, including those
not in a position to confer evolutionary benefits on us. It is unclear in particular
how evolutionary tendencies especially enhance the quality of life of the outcast
and the oppressed. Thus the project of creating an "evolutionary left," to
counteract the Herbert Spencers and William Graham Sumners of the world, seems
doubtful at best. Reciprocal altruism and repeatable patterns of cooperation tend to
bypass those not in a position to directly or indirectly help us or those we care
about. For background, see Robert Trivers, the Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
46 Q Rev Biol 35 (1971) and more generally, Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of
Cooperation (Harv U Press, 1984). For a brief but intriguing discussion by a non-
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Singer also notes that young children are generally incapable of
the mens rea elements of serious crimes, and therefore cannot be
thought to "deserve" to die, as might an adult, 7 In contrast, Michael
Perry might ask whether the utiles of hatred toward Quasimodo
deserve to count (positively) at all, at any level. As well, Singer
argues that "where rights are at risk, we should err on the side of
safety."8" The force of this concern, however, depends on potentially
controversial prior rights assignments. Just as some utilitarians and
others would argue that even innocent children and adults do not
have a genuine moral right to not be killed, some might argue that
one or more crucial rights at stake in such cases may actually be held
by persons adversely affected by the child. If there are rights claims
on both sides, a wish to err on the side of protecting rights will not be
of much assistance. Singer's idea may instead be that a right or
interest in physical safety usually outweighs competing interests. It
is not clear, though, why Singer would believe this of relatively
young children.
Singer concludes that "[w]e should certainly put very strict
conditions on permissible infanticide; but these restrictions might
owe more to the effects of infanticide on others than to the intrinsic
wrongness of killing an infant." 9 Doubtless the indirect effects of
specialist polymath, see George Ellis, Before the Beginning 108-09 (Marian Boyars
Pub, 1993).
87. Singer, Practical Ethics at 170 (cited in note 42).
88. Id at 172. Singer's reference to rights should be clarified. He writes earlier
that "I am not convinced that the notion of a moral right is a helpful or meaningful
one, except where it is used as a shorthand way of referring to more fundamental
moral considerations." Id at 96. By "more fundamental moral considerations,"
Singer presumably means not moral duties and obligations, but interests, desires,
and preferences, as properly counted and weighed. As a practical matter, to
consistently disavow the use of the idea of a moral right, while other schools of
thought still use such terminology, is still to place oneself at a rhetorical
disadvantage. For background, see, for example, Mark Tushnet, An Essay On
Rights 62 Tex L Rev 1363 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication:
Fin de Siecle 335 (Harv U Press, 1997); id at 334 ("Having lost one's faith in
rights discourse is perfectly consistent with, indeed often associated with, a
passionate belief in radical expansion of citizen rights against the state").
89. Id at 173. Once indirect effects are taken into account, of course, it
becomes possible for any utilitarian to prohibit post-birth killings, or killings after a
month, or at any other point, as Singer argues. The matter becomes quickly
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killing children are multiple and difficult to predict, even if we ignore
aggregate or long-term consequences. But it is difficult to see how
paying special attention to the interests, preferences, or desires of
other persons would help Quasimodo at any age. As we shall see
further below,9" Quasimodo at any age is widely and deeply, if quite
absurdly, detested. Michael Perry can argue at this point that these
popular feelings simply should not morally count, based on the
nature or character of these feelings. A surprising number of persons
believe, however erroneously, that their basic interests are somehow
undermined by Quasimodo's continued existence. Quasimodo
himself, particularly as a child, can offer at most only a modest
counterweight to those perceived interests. Perhaps the least
unavailing utilitarian case for allowing the young Quasimodo to
continue to live has, perhaps disturbingly, less to do with Quasimodo
and his life than with the broader historical battle against superstition
and oppression in general. On the most favorable utilitarian analysis,
Quasimodo's life might well hinge on whether he can be turned into
a useful object lesson.
Singer explicitly recognizes, and indeed insists upon, the
difference between a world in which his or any other set of moral
rules is implemented flawlessly, and our second-best world of
imperfect information, cognitive and other biases, self-indulgence,
desensitization, public bads, slippery slopes, cascade effects, chaos
theory, and unpredicted long-term consequences. He therefore raises
the possibility of establishing a remarkable gulf between the
technically "correct" moral status of infanticide and the more
restrictive way the law of homicide should continue to treat
infanticide and the killing of older children generally.9
Alternatively, Singer argues, there may well be an important practical
difference here between what R.M. Hare has referred to as the"critical" and "intuitive" levels of morality itself.92  What is
swallowed up in speculative empirical uncertainties. For more extensive
discussion, see Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (Clarendon Press, 1983).
90. See notes 98-101.
91. Singer, Practical Ethics at 172 (cited in note 42).
92. Id at 172, 92-93 (citing Richard M. Hare, Moral Thinking. Its Levels,
Method and Point (Oxford U Press, 1981)). Hare suggests, id at 43, that "the
critical thinker considers cases in an act-utilitarian or specific rule-utilitarian way,
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permissible at the critical (or "study carrel") level of morality need
not also be permitted at the intuitive (or "mass applicability") level.
Thus Singer can, as often as he wishes, reach the same final moral
recommendation as Michael Perry.
Relying on either of these distinctions, however, creates its own
problems. It is difficult to compartmentalize dramatically different
and practically irreconcilable moral and legal approaches to, let us
suppose, the parental killing of a (replaceable) one or two year old.
In some such cases, Singer's moral philosophy may well conclude
that such a killing is, all things considered, not morally wrong. Yet
the law, however forgiving it may be of the killing of a one or two
year old under many difficult circumstances, will also want to retain
the option of severity in some other cases. Expecting a society to say
that the dispatching of a particular two-year-old was both really not
morally objectionable and yet deserving of a prison term is probably
to expect too much.
This is not a matter of logical inconsistency, as though we had
classified a crime as both malum prohibitum and malum in se.
Rather, it is difficult to imagine a stable, long-term cultural practice
and on the basis of these he selects ... general prima facie principles for use, in a
general rule-utilitarian way, at the intuitive level." See also Practical Ethics at
245-46 (cited in note 42), in which Singer somewhat disturbingly discusses a
strategic decision to not publicly advocate what he views as the "critically" correct
moral standard of poverty relief, and to instead advocate some "intuitive,"
otherwise incorrect, lower standard, lest publicizing the higher standard backfire by
inspiring less public responsiveness to the problem of poverty. This sort of
benignly intended duplicity, vaguely akin to a Socratic "noble lie" embodying a
deeper truth, is "always a possibility" on Singer's account. Id at 245. We must
then wonder whether it really maximizes utility for Singer to publicly acknowledge
this "dualism." Those less inclined to favor international relief of poverty may
score public points against Singer's views-real, or for public consumption-by
pointing out just this duality. Of course, it is possible that Singer has still actually
never told us his deepest moral beliefs about the morally ideal level of international
poverty relief, and is in this sense still esoterically utilizing his dualism at this level.
At some point, all this multi-layered utilitarian strategizing of course becomes
dysfunctional from a utilitarian standpoint. See John Gray, Indirect Utility and
Fundamental Rights 73; Allan Gibbard, Utilitarianism and Human Rights 92; and
James Fishkin, Comment on Gibbard 103 in Ellen Frankel Paul, Jeffrey Paul &
Fred D. Miller, eds, Human Rights (Basil Blackwell, 1984) (attempting to sort out
the nature or varieties of, and the attractions and deficiencies of, indirect
utilitarianism, of which Singer's approach would. constitute one variant).
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in which we impose prison terms for actions we believe are morally
permissible, if not morally right. Realistically, we will either
gradually cease to impose such sentences or we will reconceive or
reweight the various interests at stake, including long-term indirect
interests, and then judge some such killings to be morally wrong.
Roughly the same analysis applies if we pursue instead the
distinction between critical morality, at which some infanticides and
child killings would be morally permissible if not morally required,
and intuitive morality, at which only early infanticides could be
morally permissible, and a flat moral prohibition might be imposed
on all others.
Singer's recourse to these two-level analyses seems
theoretically unobjectionable. It resembles the standard move in
which a utilitarian publicly endorses a flat "rule" against killing
innocent adults, on the grounds that allowing persons to try to
accurately recognize the rare genuine exceptions to such a rule will
lead to worse consequences overall than the otherwise "second-best"
approach of uniformly following such a "rule." Such a
recommendation is still consistent utilitarianism, guided at every turn
by a concern for optimal net consequences.
But to say that the killing of a particular one or two year old is
right at the level of critical morality and wrong at the level of
intuitive morality may in practice again put too much pressure on the
distinction between the two levels of morality. When Singer invokes
"intuitive" morality, doubtless he does so on utilitarian grounds, in
some principled way, and we may assume that his choice of the
particular "intuitive" rule is similarly sound. Surely the "critical"
permissibility of a broader range of child killings could not be kept
hidden and esoteric, known only to the cognoscenti. If there is a
sense in which a particular child killing was really the morally right
course, the criminally accused, or the morally impugned, will learn of
that sense, and wish to emphasize it heavily.
In all likelihood, the long-term vitality of a more restrictive
"intuitive" rule against killing would depend, illicitly from a
utilitarian standpoint, on the residual authority of a lingering cultural
sense that some killings may be morally wrong for non-utilitarian
reasons. It is at such points that Michael Perry's insistence on human
dignity, intrinsic worth, and universal fraternity comes into play. The
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stable authority, in practice, of more restrictive "intuitive" moral
rules would, however unintentionally, thus implicitly trade on our
continuing sense that some killings are morally wrong on traditional
theories of the sort championed by Perry.
Singer himself considers a general historical prohibition on
infanticide to be rather narrowly religiously derived,93 and notes that
it is characteristic of only some societies, and not others.94 Actually,
it is difficult to know whether the standard prohibition on infanticide
is a direct reflection of particular religious doctrines. Anyone can
worry about any slippery slope, or about gradual desensitization, and
it may also be that infanticide is less characteristic of relatively
wealthy societies. A wealthy society in this sense could be any
society that has developed an economic surplus such that a family's
basic well-being is not jeopardized by a child who is severely
disabled, or who seems likely to be a long term economic liability.
More broadly, there is perhaps even a lurking motivational
tension between what Singer finds morally permissible in this
context, and what he sees as the morally proper treatment of disabled
adult jobseekers. This problem, again, is not directly one of logical
inconsistency. Instead, it is mainly a matter of what it is realistic to
expect, over the long term, of ordinary persons. The problem is, as
Michael Perry recognizes, one of motivation and consistency. Singer
believes that we should see the killing of disabled infants, in
appropriate instances, as a morally permissible or good thing. Singer
also believes, as we have seen, in some degree of societal sacrifice in
favor of disabled adult jobseekers and disabled employees. 95 It is
certainly possible to consistently hold both of these views. That it is
possible to do so without contradiction, however, does not show that
most people, over the long term, will find it psychologically practical
or attractive to do so. Adults with disabilities lack the advantages, on
Singer's account, of diminutive size, cuteness, and the ability to
evoke protectiveness. Certainly, disabled adults will on the other
hand have interests and capacities not held by infants.96 But it is
already difficult enough, as Michael Perry recognizes, to persuade
93. Id at 172.
94. Id.
95. Id at 52-53.
96. Idat 171.
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people of the justice of substantial sacrifice in favor of an adult
stranger who is disabled. It may eventually prove even more difficult
to motivate such sacrifice in favor of persons whose disabilities once
counted to some degree in favor of their death, for the sake of the
interests of others.
Let us then turn to briefly consider the distinctive moral issues
raised by Quasimodo not as child, but as an adult. Again, Singer
would want at a minimum to reasonably accommodate Quasimodo in
his capacity as bellringer.97 It is far from clear, however, that
Singer's utilitarianism can even protect the adult Quasimodo from
the barbaric depredations of the Parisian establishment and the Paris
mob. It is certainly possible for Singer to argue that allowing
Quasimodo's mocking, misunderstood investiture as the "Pope of
Fools" and his later pillorying cater to the absurd religious
superstitions of the mob and to their revulsion at his appearance.
Singer can then point out that it is in the long-term real interests of
the masses that their superstitions be denounced and extirpated,
rather than catered to. The masses generally think Quasimodo
demonic,9" wicked,99 a consort of witches,' and a caster of spells.'
97. Actually, Quasimodo would have had as much interest in OSHA protection
as in the ADA. The combination of his congenital disabilities and a "workplace
accident" resulting in a further disability had a multiplicative adverse effect on his
psyche and status. Victor Hugo's account is as follows:
Bellringer of Notre-Dame at fourteen, yet a new infirmity came to
complete his apartness. The bells had broken his tympanum, so he
had become deaf. The only door that nature had left open wide to the
world had suddenly been closed forever.
And its closing cut off the only ray of joy and light that had penetrated
to the soul of Quasimodo. That soul was plunged into profound
darkness. The wretch's melancholy became incurable and as
complete as his deformity. Besides, his deafness rendered him in
some way dumb. For, in order that he might not be laughed at, from
the moment he knew he was deaf, he resolutely determined to keep
silent.
Hugo, Hunchback at 154 (cited in note 70). Query whether a utilitarian should take
this sort of constant melancholy into consideration when making moral decisions
affecting Quasimodo. Does the politically regressive character of some of the
causes of Quasimodo's melancholy bar its being considered?
98. Idat52.
99. Id.
[Vol XIV
113] MICHAEL PERRY, PETER SINGER, & QUASIMODO 137
This sort of thinking, however intensely felt, does not herald the
acme of human fulfillment.
Singer is thus certainly entitled to recognize the indirect, long-
term costs of catering to ignorance and superstition, and the
corresponding benefits of promoting enlightenment. But none of this
necessarily carries the day on a utilitarian calculus. It would be an
odd sort of utilitarianism that absolutized enlightenment over the
indulgence of mass superstition and vulgar, if intense and widely
shared, prejudice, either at the level of general moral principle or of
particular decisions. Utilitarianism is not, and does not guarantee,
perfectionism. Neither does it invariably validate the sort of
universal fraternity endorsed by Perry. The public authorities wish
Quasimodo to be pilloried. The crowd's reaction, at the pillorying
and when they mockingly name Quasimodo as "Pope of Fools" in a
way he mistakenly enjoys, ranges from intense visceral hostility, to
fear, to contempt, to amusement at his plight. 2 Consider, for
example, the moment in which
Quasimodo again looked at the crowd despairingly, and repeated
in a tone yet more heartrending, "Some water!"
But again everybody laughed ....
A woman threw a stone at Quasimodo's head. "This will teach
you to wake us at night with your cursed ringing!'10 3
These sentiments admittedly are not - universally shared.
Esmeralda in particular is moved with pity,"° though even after her
100. Idat 53.
101. Id.
102. Id at 229-31. For the mocking investiture of Quasimodo, affording the best
of all direct utilitarian worlds, in which both the crowd and Quasimodo are
delighted with the proceedings, see id at 51-54, 69-70. See especially id at 65 ("It
is difficult to give an idea of how much pride and beatific satisfaction registered on
the usually sad and always hideous visage of Quasimodo as he rode. It was the
first moment of self-love he had ever enjoyed .... He took seriously all the
ironical applause, all the mock respect . . .."). Query whether the moral wrongness
of this abuse of a deformed or disabled person should depend on, for example,
whether Quasimodo eventually realizes the true nature of the proceedings, and is
then embarrassed or angry. Of course, some deduction on utilitarian grounds must
be made for ,any adverse consequences flowing from anyone's being led by this
incident to mock or deceive, successfully or not, other persons.
103. Idat231.
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own rescue by Quasimodo, she cannot overcome her feelings of
repugnance at Quasimodo's appearance.' Certainly, Quasimodo's
sentiments can be weighed in the utilitarian balance against his own
pillorying, though probably not against his mock investiture. If any
device ever suggested our applying a hedonic calculus, it is certainly
the lash. But even on this dimension, the long familiar public
response to his disabilities and appearance has, perversely, tended to
undermine the severity of some of the pillorying's effects on
Quasimodo. His reaction is, to his credit, initially one of
incomprehension, and his ultimate reaction still lacks some of the
dimensions we might have expected: "On his face there was neither
shame nor blush. He was too far from the state of society and too
near the state of nature0 6 to know what shame was."' 7  His
Rousseauian noble savagery thus disserves him on the utilitarian
calculus.
The utilitarian thus cannot simply pronounce Quasimodo's
pillorying a sadistic travesty. Quasimodo is used to public contempt,
though certainly not to physically painful abuse, and it is not
surprising when persons in such circumstances develop a kind of
psychic carapace to minimize all but the most elementally physical
shocks. Nor does the pillorying substantially undercut what are
called, however crudely, Quasimodo's central life projects,' 8 or his
central life interests, beyond the pain and the brute physical
dimensions of the flogging itself. Quasimodo's interests, desires, and
preferences cannot simply be automatically elevated above those of
the mob. They must, however central one or more of them may be to
Quasimodo, rest in the balance against those of a mob whose
grievances against Quasimodo are in some cases quite basic, long-
standing, and intense (however fearful, intrusive, superstitious, or
otherwise misguided).
Singer thus cannot say, with even a modest degree of
assuredness, that the papal investiture or even the pillorying of
104. Hugo, Hunchback at 232 (cited in note 70).
105. Id at 368.
106. Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality 175 (Oxford
U Press, 1950).
107. Hugo, Hunchback at 229 (cited in note 70).
108. See notes 110-15.
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Quasimodo failed to maximize the preference satisfaction of all
affected parties. Instead, the utilitarian logic of Singer's position
forces him to inquire, somewhat disturbingly, into matters such as the
sheer size of the mob, its intensity, its shifting moods, and more
speculatively, whether Parisians over some arbitrary time frame
might be capable of disposing of some of their crudely oppressive
superstitions along with, eventually, their similarly oppressive ruling
elites. In contrast, it is open to Michael Perry to more directly reach
the right result in this case by an immediate appeal, for example, to
human dignity.
These sorts of problems, however, do not exhaust those that
Singer must face. They are not even the most interesting such
problems. Contemporary disability activists and theorists have
argued that the value of the lives and projects of many disabled
persons tends to be opaque to the nondisabled. °9 At its most blunt,
direct, and potentially threatening, the question ignorantly posed by
the non-disabled is one of how the disabled can 'live like that.' In
part, addressing this occasionally life-and-death problem is a matter
of gradually enlightening non-disabled persons to unexpected sorts of
value. With the task of enlightening the beknighted, the utilitarian
can readily manage. But the problem goes deeper. There may as
well be value in the life and "life projects" of a disabled person that is
unlikely to be recognized, let alone somehow properly weighed and
assessed, by the utilitarian decisionmaker. There can even be
positive value in the failure or "frustration" of one's projects. This
adds to the arbitrariness, misguidedness, and indeterminacy, of
Singer's logic and outcomes.
We can, as potential moral decisionmakers, admittedly see
value in Quasimodo's heroic rescue of Esmeralda." ° Even the crowd
sees some sort of value in Quasimodo's act, and in Quasimodo
himself, at least at that moment."' Quasimodo is at this point not
109. Shapiro, No Pity 4, 14, 85, 282 (cited in note 72).
110. Hugo, Hunchback at 347-48 (cited in note 70).
111. Id at 347. ("The women laughed and wept; the crowd stamped their feet
enthusiastically, for at that moment Quasimodo was really beautiful. He was
handsome-this orphan, this foundling, this outcast. He felt himself august and
strong").
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oblivious to his own heroism.'12 Trying to place some sort of
determinate moral value on this, or on Quasimodo's humble and
largely unrequited devotion to Esmeralda," 3 lead the utilitarian into
arbitrariness. But at least we are here aware of, and have words to
characterize, the presence of morally relevant value.
Are moral decisionmakers, on the other hand, likely to
recognize, let alone somehow properly assess, the value of
Quasimodo's sheer physicality, and the inarticulable dimensions of
his sensuous, deeply social, and conceivably even spiritual
relationship with the bells and gargoyles, ropes and passages, of
Notre Dame? This is an essentially private world, largely
unobservable and uncognizable by the outsider.
How does the utilitarian recognize and weigh the possibility of
sublimity? What coefficient, roughly, is to be given to the ineffable?
Perry's general approach is sounder here. Perhaps there is even some
risk that a society's thinking in utilitarian terms will lead to
increasing insensitivity toward, if it does not actually undermine,
such value. Can the utilitarian simply say that reactionary, barbarous
Notre Dame is clearly part of the problem, that Notre Dame and what
it stands for oppress and disable Quasimodo, so that the positive and
negative utility terms neatly cancel one another? This would be an
astonishing coincidence. Can the utilitarian say that whenever the
utilitarian calculus strikes us as especially hazy or suspect, we should
then drop down to some unspecified "intuitive" moral rule? Consider
a portion of Victor Hugo's description:
the cathedral did seem like a creature, docile and obedient in his
hands. She waited upon his will to .lift up her loud voice; she
was possessed by him; she was filled with Quasimodo, as with
some familiar spirit. You would have said that he made this
immense structure breathe." 14
Hugo concludes: "Egypt would have taken him for the god of
this temple; the Middle Ages believed him to be its demon. But he
was in fact its soul.""' 5 Translating any of this into utilitarian terms
with any fidelity seems almost unimaginable. Even at the very least,
112. Idat347-48.
113. Idat368.
114. Idat 154.
115. Hugo at 154 (cited in note 70).
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the utilitarian is forced not merely to count, but to radically choose
among utterly distinct general understandings of value.
Our dim recognition of these elements of Quasimodo's life
suggests that Quasimodo and his "projects" are neither graspable nor
replaceable values. It would even be misleading to say that
Quasimodo is of infinite value, as this might hold open the possibility
of quantitatively comparing Quasimodo's life with that of some other
commensurately infinitely valuable person. Quasimodo's life is
perhaps better thought of as irreplaceable, even if he were to be killed
and in a crude sense "replaced" by another bellringer." 6 Quasimodo
is in this sense morally incommensurable, as are the rest of us, even
if we can be reasonably called upon, tragically, to sacrifice our lives,
and even if we do not live our lives with the same sublimity as
Quasimodo's. Quasimodo's life is obviously more sequestered than
ours, but in a deeper sense, the nature of each of our lives is not fully
publicly accessible. Our incommensurable "value" in this sense is
really no more empirically observable, and no more articulable by
ourselves or by others, than is Quasimodo's. Again, the contrasting
approach of Michael Perry reaches the right results with immediacy.
As soon as we recognize that Quasimodo is our neighbor, we know
there are certain things we must not do to him.
In sum, we cannot realistically hope to grasp and meaningfully
assign even some rough "value""' 7 to the life of a disabled person. If
this means that we must therefore posit occult, mysterious entities
such as incommensurable value, despite our occasional willingness to
sacrifice one to save many, that is where our experiences have
inescapably led us. Let us note, though, that Singer himself chooses
to rely on arguments of a different, but in a sense equally occult
status. Consider the ultimate mysteriousness of how Singer seeks to
transcend the relatively simple moral world of real pains and
pleasures:
an action contrary to the preference of any being is, unless this
preference is outweighed by contrary preferences, wrong.
Killing a person who prefers to continue living is therefore
wrong, other things being equal. That the victims are not around
after the act to lament the fact that their preferences have been
116. Singer, Practical Ethics at 186 (cited in note 42)
117. This would encompass both cardinal and ordinal or ranking values.
JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION
disregarded is irrelevant. The wrong is done when the
preference is thwarted."'
This seems familiar enough, but on reflection, it is actually too
exotic to remain within the bounds of any standard utilitarianism.
Certainly, a utilitarian can take into consideration the various indirect
post-mortem effects of killing a person who is, let us say, asleep,
heavily sedated, or in a deep, prolonged coma. But to go much
beyond this is to press beyond the limits of any familiar sort of
utilitarianism. Calling it 'preference utilitarianism' does not by itself
explain or motivate an inclusive focus on preferences unrelated to
any kind of pleasure or pain.
There is an obvious utilitarian difference between a prolonged,
dreaded, agonizing death, and a painless, unanticipated death, by foul
play or otherwise, during sleep. There is also a utilitarian difference
between the conscious frustration of our desires, when we know they
are being thwarted, and the never-conscious "frustration" of our
desires, in the sense of an extinction and non-fulfillment of desires,
where we do not anticipate or experience that extinction or non-
fulfillment. It is far from clear how Singer can cogently treat these
situations similarly. To do so is to attach utilitarian moral weight to
utterly unexperienced events as though we had experienced them.
For a utilitarian to rely on what is not experienced, perhaps even in
the permanent absence of an experiencing subject, is mysterious.
Doubtless there are all sorts of sound indirect utilitarian reasons for
keeping deathbed promises, carrying out the wills of the deceased,
and such. But Singer clearly wants to go beyond this.
Let us suppose that I have a desire that simply evaporates and
loses its motive force, without being fulfilled or replaced. I merely
note the passing of my desire, without emotion. This desire, while
certainly not frustrated, is also not fulfilled. Is this also a bad thing
from Singer's standpoint? Why isn't it perhaps a good thing, along
Stoic, Buddhist, or Thoreauvian lines? What if another person
strongly desires to extinguish, in just this way, my weaker desire, and
does so? Isn't this a good thing from a utilitarian standpoint, all
else-including indirect consequence-equal? What if that
intervener extinguishes the desire in one person's mind but
118. Id at 94.
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simultaneously transplants it to various other minds," 9 without
conflict?
Singer speaks of the idea of 'violation,' and of making"nonsense of everything that the victim has been trying to do"' 0 in
the case of the killing of unconscious persons. We have seen reason
to wonder whether this really makes sense from a utilitarian
standpoint. There is certainly a sense in which our long-term desires
do not cease when we are unconscious.' But why should a desire
that is not now felt, and never again will be felt, directly count?
Ultimately, the logic of violation or of making nonsense of the lives
of unconscious homicide victims is really not entirely utilitarian.
Rather, these ideas take much of their force from, and have their
home in, non-utilitarian understandings of human dignity. Michael
Perry can, in contrast to Singer, appeal directly to the ideas of
violation, and of undermining the meaning of a person's life, even
where the victim does not consciously experience or recognize such
violation. This flows from any reasonable elaboration of the idea of
human dignity.
Singer's utilitarianism really cannot satisfactorily explain the
right moral outcomes in such unconscious homicide victim cases. It
may not even provide the morally right outcomes. At best, Singer's
approach is unnecessarily indeterminate. What if, however
unattractively, we are forced to choose between killing A and killing
the generally similar B, where A has made a firm and successful
long-term commitment to his own intense sensory gratification,
whereas B has recently lost his faith in a similar lifestyle, but has not
yet formed any serious replacement projects or basic commitments?
Singer seems committed, all else equal, to the view that it is actually
119. For a particularly exotic set of possibilities, designed to resolve some deep
and challenging problems in the interpretation of quantum mechanics, see, for
example, David Z. Albert, Quantum Mechanics and Experience 130 (Harv U Press,
1992); Michael Lockwood, Many Minds Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics 47
Brit J Phil Sci 159 (1996); David Papineau, Many Minds Are No Worse Than One
47 Brit J Phil Sci 233 (1996). For brief speculation on some possible moral and
legal consequences of related ideas, see R. George Wright, Should the Law Reflect
the World?: Lessons For the Law from Quantum Mechanics 18 Fla St U L Rev 855
(1991).
120. Singer, Practical Ethics at 95 (cited in note 42).
121. Idat98-100.
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worse to kill A rather than B. But this seems doubtful, for reasons
most naturally expounded from a non-utilitarian dignitary
perspective.
Or suppose the choice is between A above and C, where C has,
at age 35, just achieved the admirable goal to which she has single-
mindedly devoted all of her thoughts and efforts for the past two
decades. Indirect effects again held constant, should we say, as
Singer seems committed to, that it is better to kill C than A? After
all, A has his ongoing "central" projects and commitments, whereas
C does not. But again, this seems doubtful, at least if we set aside the
indirect incentive effects.
A deeper challenge to Singer, however, is that of the ultimate
meaninglessness and sheer arbitrariness, from a rational standpoint,
of acting in accordance with Singer's thin metaethics and utilitarian
standards. Here, the approach taken by Michael Perry offers real
advantages. Problems of ultimate meaninglessness and of
arbitrariness loom large for Singer, as he rejects any "mysterious
realm of objective ethical facts."' 22 He wishes us, nonetheless, to
adopt a universalist approach, in which we equally consider the
interests of all affected parties along with our own. He recognizes
the possibility of a selfish devotion to one's own narrow personal
interests, 23 and rightly concludes that such a narrowly focused life
will typically not be particularly meaningful. 24 Of course, a society
may find continued adherence to a now non-objective morality to be
meaningful in some sense, at least for a time, just as a person might
find meaning in an arbitrary devotion to the Hatfield clan. However,
as Perry recognizes, this does not really resolve the problem of moral
meaningfulness, or show the moral life to any rational advantage in
this respect.
122. Id at 8. Out of an abundance of caution, we might emphasize that Singer is
here rejecting moral objectivity in general, not just some particularly mysterious
version thereof.
123. Id at 317.
124. Id at 332. For discussion of the familiar idea of the ultimate
unsatisfactoriness of a devotion to consumption of goods and services, see R.
George Wright, Selling Words ch 1 (NYU Press, 1997). Classically, see, for
example, The Bhagavad-Gita 134 (Columbia U Press, Barbara Stoler Miller, Trans,
1986) ("In their certainty that life consists in sating their desires, they suffer
immeasurable anxiety that ends only with death.").
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The basic problem Singer must face, given his rejection of
objective morality, is to show first that the morally lived utilitarian
life is genuinely meaningful in a socially stable way and not
ultimately arbitrary from a rational standpoint, and second that lives
that do not aspire to utilitarian or other universalist morality, but are
also not narrowly self-absorbed, are somehow less meaningful than
Singer's own moral schema. This is, in effect, the challenge posed
by Perry. To simplify Singer's task, we shall join him in assuming
that the life of self-absorption is likely to be unappealing over the
long term. Actually, it may well be that with future technological
advances of various sorts, the life of self-indulgence and self-
gratification will come to be, if not meaningful, much more efficient
and at least thoroughly preferred by those who can afford it. This
prospect should give Singer pause. Singer deserves great credit for
not simply dismissing the problem of ultimate meaninglessness. But
it cannot be said that his analysis is reassuring.
On Singer's view, moral principles are not rationally binding,
or somehow authoritative for us, or a reflection of some sort of order
of nature or the universe. The universe itself is presumably
meaningless. There is no objective morality, and it is not objectively
right to aim to act in accordance with any moral scheme. Whatever
we do to Quasimodo may be approved by a large group, but cannot
possibly be "really" right or wrong. Morality is in this sense
gratuitous. Michael Perry recognizes the realistic implications of this
view. If it pays us to ignore, or to merely pretend to adhere to, some
moral scheme, it is not "really" wrong to do so. There is, as Perry
argues in particular, not much reason to accommodate the interests of
the weak, of the poor, of other species, of those with congenital
disabilities,12 or in general of those not likely to be in a position to
reward or punish us. Sacrifice on behalf of strangers, and those who
cannot benefit us in return, is as Perry recognizes especially curious,
in addition to being ultimately arbitrary. It may be a popular or
125. We would expect the congenitally disabled, and in particular the severely
congenitally disabled, to lose by the absence of any binding, authoritative moral
rule requiring assistance or compensation. On the other hand, those disabilities to
which the rest of us may as adults yet become vulnerable, such as back problems
affecting one's ability to work, might under such circumstances be better
accommodated.
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amusing public pose, at least for a time. Particularly for those who
are moderately well off, and who have resources that might well
benefit those far less well off, this pose may eventually lose its
appeal. We are in the long run probably better off catering to, or
insisting on equality with, those who are close or powerful enough to
threaten or reward us in some way. In a meaningless universe, we
cannot simply construct a stable moral meaningfulness from scratch.
Of course, we can invest any object or pursuit with a certain
gratuitous significance merely by choosing, however arbitrarily, to
care about it intensely and prolongedly. 26 In this fragile sense, non-
objective morality can, along with joining even a completely
fungible, non-service oriented fraternity or rooting for a sports team,
confer meaning. The problem for Singer then becomes one of
showing how, in this sense of meaningfulness, the moral life is likely
to be more meaningful than lives that do not aim at equal and
universal concern for others, but that also avoid unduly narrow and
ultimately unsatisfying self-absorption. It is, as Perry argues, quite
common to create this sort of meaningfulness through caring about
some other persons, while falling far short of Singer's broad moral
concern.'27 The range of one's concern may be limited to a favorite
species, class, country, partisan cause, clan, family, or to some other
limited grouping no more objectively meritorious than another.
Meaningfulness therein derives from identifying with and helping
limited groups, reviling and battling selected antagonists, and
manifesting indifference or feigned, at best trivial benevolence to
most others. This sort of life can easily be, unfortunately, at least as
126. Singer recognizes, for example, the possibility of devoting oneself to
postage stamp collecting. Singer, Practical Ethics at 334 (cited in note 42).
127. For one reaction by Singer to the problem of focused concern on one's
close relatives and the evolutionary precariousness of broader concerns, see id at
243. As well, it would at least raise a question for Singer to reduce morality to
something like mere preference satisfaction, but to then adopt an understanding of
the meaningfulness or significance of life that transcends this standard. If there
were more to the meaningfulness of life than some sort of preference satisfaction,
we might, perhaps, want to reflect that in our moral scheme. For discussion of the
moral point of view in general, see, for example, Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of
View (Cornell U Press, 1965); Bernard Gert, Morality: A New Justification of the
Moral Rules (Oxford U Press, 1988).
[Vol XIV
113] MICHAEL PERRY, PETER SINGER, & QUASIMODO 147
emotionally meaningful as anything Singer's broad, moral focus can
offer.
Since it is not objectively authoritative or rationally binding,
and may well not maximize one's long-term gratification,
particularly if one is well off, why bother to adopt the impartial moral
point of view? Why really sacrifice for the wretched of the earth,
unless one thereby somehow scores points? Singer does not pretend
to offer a universally cogent answer to Perry's questions in this
regard, or to address the circumstances of the well off in particular in
this context. He does offer two general considerations. First, there
are some fascinations, unlike a commitment to the broad, moral point
of view that many of us grow out of. Singer notes that some persons
"find collecting stamps an entirely adequate way of giving purpose to
their lives. There is nothing irrational about that; but others grow out
of stamp collecting... To this group the ethical point of view offers
a meaning and purpose in life that one does not grow out of."' 28
Most of us, still along with many moral philosophers, do not yet
think of morality as a matter of collective juvenalia out of which we
eventually mature. But there is, on Singers's own analysis, no reason
not to think of morality in roughly this way. Again, morality lacks
any objective cogency. Why not view morality as a delusion,
whether genuinely useful or not, or as the revenge of the weak, or as
a collective con game or a device for repressing disfavored particular
groups? Any number of schools of thought have come to reject all
moral thinking as Singer understands it.'29 Such philosophers, and
other academics, could easily conclude that they have intellectually
and emotionally outgrown moral thinking. Some might recommend
that the rest of us follow suit; others might not. A number of
narrower, non-moral commitments may thus be no less stable than a
commitment to non-objective morality.
Singer's second attempt to show that morality offers greater
meaningfulness than non-moral group commitments is a bit more
abstract. He argues that "looking at things ethically is a way of...
identifying ourselves with the most objective point of view
128. Singer, Practical Ethics at 334 (cited in note 42).
129. John L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin, 1977);
Richard Gamer, Beyond Morality (Temple U Press, 1994).
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possible-with... 'the point of view of the universe.""'  This is,
however, a curious argument for Singer to make. Singer here adopts
the literal terminology of Michael Perry's argument, but not its
substance. 'Objective,' as Singer here uses the term, can mean only
something like 'broadsweeping' or 'encompassing,' as opposed to
focused or relatively narrow. Surely it is either mistaken or merely
question begging for Singer to suppose here that the noncognitivist
moral point of view is "really" the best perspective to adopt from the
standpoint of rationality.
This is partly a matter of the connotations of verbal labels. In
our culture, at least, a "broad" point of view seems associated with
inclusiveness and non-discrimination, and a "narrow" point of view
with less appealing qualities. But these associations of 'broad' and'narrow' have their appeal only within an assumed moral context. It
is better to be socially inclusive than non-inclusive. But this is so
only once we have already adopted the moral perspective, and
whether we should rationally do this is precisely what is at issue. Of
course, it might also be better, in a non-moral way, to choose a way
of living based on broader considerations rather than narrower
consideration, at least up to a point. But thinking about a relatively
broad range of considerations, in Singer's world, does not lead us to
endorse a moral as opposed to a merely group-based approach to
living. Particular groups differ in their own breadth or inclusiveness
as well.
Perhaps we could avoid this error if, instead of asking whether
a broad perspective is better than a somewhat narrower perspective,
we asked whether a diffuse, barely comprehending perspective is
really better, or more meaningful, than a somewhat more focused,
more comprehending perspective. By way of loose analogy, we
might ask whether it is really more meaningful to be a competent
general practitioner than a competent heart surgeon. It is also true
that narrowing the scope of those with whom we identify or
130. Singer, Practical Ethics at 334 (cited in note 42). For an argument loosely
akin to that of Singer, see Jenny Teichman, Humanism and the Meaning of Life 6
Ratio 155, 162 (1993). For some doubts see, for example, Garth L. Hallett,
Greater Good. The Case For Proportionalism 31 (Georgetown U Press, 1995);
Robert Kane, The Ends of Metaphysics 33 Intl Phil Q 413, 427 (1993) and, to some
degree, Charles Larmore, The Right and the Good 20 Philosophia 15, 30 (1990).
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empathize-say to humans alone-does not preclude a non-moral,
but meaning-conferring interest in rotifers, viruses, trees, penguins,
Klingons, angels, and unicorns.
Doubtless there does seem something bracing about adopting,
or at least attempting, however ineptly, to adopt something called the
point of view of the universe. For some-perhaps most-this may
eventually turn out, however, a bit abstract, diluted, cold, and
unmotivating. After all, on Singer's own analysis, as opposed to
Michael Perry's, the universe does not really have a point of view. In
itself, the universe is mute and meaningless and quite possibly
destined to eventually go unceremoniously out of business. The
universe does not want us to adopt any particular point of view, let
alone its own nonexistent point of view. Why would adopting a
more general point of view then be more meaningful than some set of
loyalties, non-moral in Singer's sense, that transcend assumedly self-
defeating egoism? Michael Perry, in contrast, holds open the
possibility of a universe that can be seen as hospitable.
Let us try, then, to do a final accounting of Quasimodo's fate
under alternative regimes. What sorts of conclusions can be drawn if
we try to compare Quasimodo's life under even the especially
bizarre, grotesquely distorted if officially sanctioned historical moral
objectivism of Notre Dame, under Singer's version of utilitarianism
applied to those circumstances and events, and under Michael Perry's
understanding of human rights? No doubt Singer would much prefer
to start from scratch, on a more congenial utilitarian cultural basis,
without the superstitions and oppressive dogmas of the historic Notre
Dame, at least insofar as they failed to maximize utility. It can still,
however, be illuminating to apply utilitarian percepts to historical
circumstances largely untouched by a utilitarian culture. Doubtless
utilitarianism should want to strive for such breadth of applicability.
Singer can again offer Quasimodo, in his capacity as bellringer,
something like OSHA and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Perhaps further training, reasonable accommodations, and job
promotion should be available. At a minimum, something like
modem headphones to prevent deafness should have been provided.
This assumes, of course, that Quasimodo makes it to adulthood on a
utilitarian calculus. In contrast, the historic Notre Dame offered
limited developmental assistance, for which Quasimodo was
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immensely grateful, and much risk to life and limb. As well, Notre
Dame was at the very least complicitous, if not clearly a leading
element, in much of the underlying oppressive cultural hostility to
Quasimodo, and in his consequent suffering. The inescapably crucial
and unresolvable question, however, is whether Notre Dame can also
offer Quasimodo utter, if inarticulable, sublimity, of a sort
unencompassed within a utilitarianism without moral objectivity or a
meaningful universe.131
The mob's investiture of a deludedly delighted Quasimodo as
"Pope of Fools," and even the later pillorying of Quasimodo, pose
difficulties and uncertainties for Singer that are greater than we
should feel comfortable with. Singer, by his own logic, should in
such cases ask questions about the size of the mob, its fervor, its
constancy, the centrality of the relevant beliefs, the self-
destructiveness of those beliefs, the mob's gradual educability, and
about Quasimodo's expectations, prior state of mind, pain threshold,
and so forth. There seems great and unnecessary indeterminacy here.
Singer may arrive eventually at what we would take to be the obvious
right answer in such cases. He may even wish on some principled
utilitarian grounds to short-circuit the calculations by developing an
"intuitive level" moral rule about, for example, abusively creating
deluded joy in persons unable to recognize that the "honor"
131. It is worth noting that Quasimodo's case challenges many mainstream
accounts of the value of lives. Consider, for example, Philip Kitcher's argument:
When we try to evaluate the quality of a human life, we should attend
to three different dimensions. The first focuses on whether the person
has developed any sense of what is significant and how the conception
of what matters was formed. The second assesses the extent to which
those desires that are central to the person's life plan are satisfied: did
the person achieve those things that mattered most? Finally, the third
is concerned with the character of the person's experience, the balance
of pleasure and pain.
Philip Kitcher, The Lives to Come: the Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities
289 (Simon & Schuster, 1997). This does not bode well for Quasimodo as a young
child, and seems, in several respects, insensitive and unresponsive to Quasimodo's
life as an adult. Quasimodo's life is not focused on freely developing and then
fulfilling a life-plan in a conscious or literal sense. Few persons seem less free, or
to have less freely chosen. His balance of pleasure over pain seems, as far as
public moral decisionmakers can tell, abysmal.
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apparently being accorded is only mockery. But much of this
"intuitive" rule construction seems slightly off the track, or else an ad
hoc attempt to accommodate our intuitions that utilitarianism does in
fact take us off the track.'32 Our intuitions in this regard are more
likely to track Michael Perry's sense that contempt and hatred are the
inversion of the moral. They represent, on Perry's understanding,
withering rather than human flourishing, if any further argument
against them is necessary.
To deny moral objectivity is to deny that, in some here
unspecified but familiar sense, what the mob does to Quasimodo is
morally wrong, not just on some broad moral scheme we have
contrived, representing our best constructive efforts, but somehow
really wrong. Perry recognizes that Quasimodo's status as neighbor
is not simply a matter of moral bootstrapping. As Jean Hampton
expressed this sense,
Outside of our philosophical study... we don't think we're
merely "expressing our acceptance" of norms calling for mutual
respect and social justice when we make (sometimes great)
personal sacrifices in order to comply with these norms. We act
as if we think the authority of these norms is not "in our heads"
or traceable only to social conventions and our (cognitive or
affective) reactions to them, but "real".... 133
Doubtless there are many kinds of cases in which morality does
not require the sacrifice of even narrow self-interest. Often, acting
morally, on any reasonable theory, will seem agreeable. But
ultimately, as Perry argues, it is substantial sacrifice from us and
those who are close to us, in favor of those who cannot threaten or
repay us or our own group, for which Singer cannot offer cogent,
stable, non-arbitrary motivational reasons.'34 Objectivity of morality
132. A complication, however, lies in the possibility that the arguable sublimity
of Quasimodo's life in Notre Dame is in one or more respects causally dependent
on the public's absurd fear, contempt, and revulsion toward Quasimodo.
133. Jean E. Hampton, in Richard Healey, ed, The Authority of Reason 120
(Cambridge U Press, 1998). For further general discussion, see Nicholas Rescher,
Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Reason chs 9-10 (UND Press, 1997).
134. Consider a case in which a modem day Quasimodo comes to slightly prefer
working, for a time, at a small family owned restaurant-in the unenlightened
section of town-to continuing his vocation as bellringer. Let us assume that some
patrons will react negatively to the fully qualified Quasimodo, based on sheer
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is, despite the sordid history of abuse that Perry fully recognizes
along with its shining moments, the best hope of the outcast and the
oppressed. It is precisely the outcast and the oppressed, who lack the
ability to bargain or threaten credibly, who have the clearest stake in
objective morality.
Singer's abandonment of moral objectivity thus unintentionally
undermines the interests of the powerless, the outcast, and the
oppressed. If Singer offered any cogent reason for supposing moral
objectivity to be a delusion, this result might be sound and inevitable,
however unfortunate and unattractive. He does not offer any such
cogent reason, however, so any additional suffering imposed on the
powerless by the abandonment of moral objectivity seems itself
gratuitous. Certainly, Michael Perry does not attempt to establish the
existence or binding validity of any set of human rights. But as we
have seen, there is much to be said even if neither Perry nor Singer
seeks to prove the validity or invalidity of any objective human rights
claims.
If it were the case that Singer's version of utilitarianism offered
the powerless and the oppressed a clear advantage of some sort, by
comparison with rival moral theories, and that such advantage could
arise only at the cost of jettisoning moral objectivity, that would be
an obviously important result. But Singer's utilitarianism offers no
such advantage. Consider again in general how Singer's theory
might handle the depredations imposed upon Quasimodo. What
strikes us is how curious, how awkward, and how indeterminate, at
best, the application and outcome of Singer's theory would be, even
if Singer is granted the retreat to "intuitive" moral rules, and to some
particular such rule, on some principled basis.
Ultimately, risks to Quasimodo, and to persons with disabilities
in general, flow from Singer's understanding, as distinctly opposed to
irrational prejudice, and that as a result, the owners of the restaurant will incur
substantial financial losses, if they are able to stay in business at all., Singer's view
seems to be that it would be morally wrong for the owners to fail to hire or to
dismiss Quasimodo on the indicated grounds. See Singer, Practical Ethics at 52
(cited in note 42). Our question is not whether Singer is right about this. Instead, it
is whether Singer can offer any cogent account to the restaurant owners of what
Singer would presumably morally require of them, in light of Singer's attenuated
metaethics. This hypothetical case, by the way, illustrates the obvious value of
some sort of tax or other subsidization program in appropriate cases.
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Perry's, of what a system of ethics really amounts to. Singer's view
is that "[e]thics, though not consciously created, is a product of social
life that has the function of promoting values common to the
members of society. Ethical judgments do this by praising and
encouraging actions in accordance with these values." '35
Persons with disabilities, along with other historically
disfavored groups, face two related problems on Singer's
understanding of the nature and function of ethics. First, while self-
fulfillment may, in various senses, be a common value, there may
also be no common value of providing the means to self-fulfillment
to congenitally disabled persons, at any substantial cost to the rest of
society. At this level, there may be conflict, as opposed to
commonality, of interest and value. No doubt congenitally disabled
persons can appeal to certain generally formulated common values in
an attempt to advance their cause. So, however, can comfortably
well off non-disabled persons who would prefer not to part with their
privileges and resources. Redressing undeserved disadvantage is not
yet a genuinely common value.
We might, as a society, have a genuine common value of trying
jointly to create more common values, and to strengthen those
common values. Such a value would, however, not tell us much
about how, concretely, to address the moral claims of disabled
persons. Nor does it seem likely that such a common value would
effectively broaden our inclination to sacrifice for the sake of persons
with disabilities. We might well imagine that one of the common
values of our society is precisely to celebrate diversity and plurality,
rather than commonality, of values. Of course, it is also open to
question whether any specifiable value is really "common to the
members"'36 of our own society, in any useful sense.
The second, and related, problem is the vaguely self-defeating
character of what Singer takes to be the function of ethics. One way
of looking at the problem is to see that if ethics is widely seen as
functional, in Singer's sense, it eventually ceases to perform its
function particularly well. To the extent that we still see morality as
somehow "real," we may see it as rationally binding and
135. Singer, Practical Ethics at 323 (cited in note 42).
136. Id.
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authoritative. To the extent, however, that we see morality as an
unconsciously constructed, if perhaps consciously maintained,
collective manipulation for the sake of some set of desired outcomes,
morality gradually tends to lose its authority and its efficacy. On
Michael Perry's approach, in contrast, ultimate meaning is to be
discovered. It can be manipulated by the powerful, but there will
then be a discoverable gulf between the pretense and the underlying
reality.
This is certainly not to suggest that even a consciously
collectively manipulative moral system is without power to maintain
or change behavior. But there comes to be nothing special about
such a system, just as there is nothing special about a Skinnerian1"
world in which we reinforce some behaviors, or the expression of
particular values. Perhaps some of us can find more and better
rewards outside the system of "praising and encouraging actions"' 3
labeled ethics. More likely, we can optimize our rewards by some
radically mixed combination of compliance, feigning, and evasion of
the system of ethics.
Persons with disabilities are likely to recognize this constructed
praise and encouragement system as a reflection not so much of
universal fraternity discussed by Perry, but of social power. They
will see this ultimately arbitrary construct as at best the rule of "one
person, one input" into the design and operation of the moral system.
Those with congenital disabilities will appreciate that such a system
is unlikely to begin to offer their deliverance from arbitrariness and
genuine injustice. They begin life, often, with fewer resources 139 with
which to praise and encourage actions by others that promote their
own basic interests. The non-disabled may, in contrast, even find it
in their interests to devote some of their own substantial resources to
praising and encouraging disabled persons to accept less
redistributive outcomes.
In sum, persons with disabilities have substantial reason not to
seek the abandonment of traditional, evolving understandings of what
137. Skinner, Beyond Freedom (cited in note 6).
138. Practical Ethics at 323 (cited in note 42).
139. Any number of disabilities, mental and physical, tend to impair one's
earning ability as the economy is currently structured. For broad discussion, see
Kavka, Disability (cited in note 66).
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human rights amount to, or of moral objectivism more generally. For
this reason, they will be much more at home in Michael Perry's
worldview than on Peter Singer's. This may be the bottom line, but
it is admittedly not yet the last word. We still need, ultimately, to
make more progress in understanding and integrating the roles of
putative universal rules and more directly consequentialist
calculations in human rights discourse and elsewhere.
At the level of normative principle, the significant difference
between Singer and Perry is not over the role of universal rules or of
absolutism. Both Singer 4° and Perry' at the very least hold open
the possibility of some exceptionless or absolute legal rules in areas
of concern to human rights advocates. Singer and Perry are, on the
other hand, equally reluctant to endorse uniform, absolute moral rules
in these areas.'42 Perry holds that at the moral level, human rights are
exceptionless only in the sense that they apply to and protect
everyone.'43 Such rights are, however, still conditional for Perry, in
the sense of being overridable on sufficiently strong moral grounds,
beyond their dependence on the general contingencies of history and
circumstance.' 44
What mainly drives Perry's human rights conditionalism at the
moral level is his sensible unwillingness to sacrifice the basic well-
140. Practical Ethics at 172 (cited in note 42).
141. Perry, Human Rights at 7, 93, 105-06 (cited in note 1). Perry's arguments
here essentially parallel those available to Singer.
142. Id at 7, 91, 95. For Singer, see Practical Ethics at ch 1 (cited in note 42).
By way of contrast, Alan Gewirth concludes that even in a nightmarish catastrophe
avoidance scenario, "[a] mother's right not to be tortured to death by her own son is
beyond any compromise. It is absolute." Alan Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on
Justification and Applications 225, 232 (UC Press, 1982). We might at least argue
that anyone who could actually thus torture their own mother, in any direct, graphic
way, would be unlikely to be the kind of person who in ordinary life would
constitute a shining moral example or typically choose well morally.
143. Perry, Human Rights at ch 3 (cited in note 1). For some doubts on this
score, see James W. Nickel at 45 (cited in note 81). In some contexts, there may be
little difference between saying either that a given right is universally held, but is
conditional and non-absolute, and saying that the same right is not universally held
by all persons. Of course, both Perry and Singer must, and do, offer answers to the
question of who or what qualifies as a proper subject or bearer of moral or legal
rights of the relevant sort.
144. Id at ch 4. See also Rescher, Objectivity at 164-69 (cited in note 133).
JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION
being of numbers of innocent persons-perhaps their very lives, or
what might be thought of as their own moral or human rights-in
order to protect some human rights claim of a single individual. The
familiar hypothetical example of sacrificing A's human right in order
to literally save the world calls for such a response. To refuse to do
so seems, as Perry notes, unduly fastidious, evasive, fanatical, or
legitimated only by appeal to some publicly unshared theological
doctrine. 45
A person's human rights can, at the moral level, therefore be
overridden under appropriately narrow circumstances. In this way,
human rights theory can avoid the above hypothetical global moral
catastrophe. But in sensibly declining to let the heavens fall, while
still taking rights seriously,'46 we open up a difficult theoretical
problem. We see much of the point of even merely prima facie or
defeasible moral rights in their power to trump'47 considerations of
utility, popular preference, or "mere" well being. Thus we would not
want to sacrifice A's human right merely for the sake of some slight
net payoff in overall social utility. Rights are still to be taken
seriously; they do not merely supervene on the result of some sort of
utility calculus.
Together, these two arguments awkwardly establish both the
overridability and the continuing independent force of moral rights.
The difficult theoretical problem lies in putting both of these
characteristics of moral rights-their overridability or conditionality,
and their real independent force-into a common language or, a bit
more formally, to put the analyses of all moral rights cases on a
common metric. We might say , that it is an inherent, built-in
limitation of a right that it no longer exists or applies if the
consequences of recognizing it in a given case become "too severe."
But this is merely a verbal solution. It is tempting to see overriding a
right in order to avoid catastrophe, while allowing a right to trump a
modest net utility gain, as two remote cases on the same underlying
spectrum. As the severity of consequences of upholding a right
increase, we doubtless do become less inclined to uphold or
145. Perry at 95, 104-05 (cited in note 1).
146. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously ch 7 (Harv U Press, 1977).
147. Idat 11.
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recognize such a right. But what is the uniform nature or "units" of
the underlying spectrum of cases along which we are moving?
The problem is not that there are middle-range cases where
many of us will be unsure whether to uphold the moral right or not,
or that such difficult middle-range cases may be common. The
problem is also really not one of where that controversial middle
ground lies. The problem is instead more basic. The middle ground,
wherever it lies, seems to involve a collision of incompatible and
untranslatable moral analytical paradigms. This is a deeper sort of
commensurability problem. It is a matter of incommensurability at a
systemic level, rather than at the level of an individual tragic moral
choice. We may call this the "golden spike" problem.
Imagine by way of analogy that we have constructed in two
segments a system to transport us from the easy, or extreme, cases of
New York and San Francisco. We started from San Francisco and
built east with railroad track, and started also from New York,
building a six-lane highway west. Our ability to travel in comfort
near either terminus is no doubt valuable, but it obscures the
incoherence of the system as a whole. What could possibly serve as
a golden spike in such a case?
Other fields of inquiry have faced similar problems. Twentieth
century physics has, for example, developed both a general relativity
theory deploying and explaining large-scale gravitational effects, and
a quantum theory to explain events at a much smaller scale of
magnitude. The problem is that if wewant to understand the physics
as a unified whole, we cannot just start at either the large-scale or the
small-scale level, with the mathematical language developed for that
level, and then work our way to the other end using that language. 48
We cannot start with relativity and work our way down until we have
neatly incorporated quantum phenomena, and we cannot apply
quantum theory to larger and larger objects until we have
encompassed massive gravitational effects. The languages involved
are at present incommensurable, or mutually untranslatable. "9
Similarly, we lack a seamless, unified, encompassing theory of
moral rights, including human rights, and their application and
148. John D. Barrow, The Origin of the Universe 88-89 (Basic Books, 1994);
Michael Lockwood, Mind Brain and the Quantum at 286-87. (Blackwell, 1990).
149. Id.
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overridability. In the absence of such a unified theory, it is tempting
to subordinate either of the two languages, or paradigm cases. Thus
one might reject any appeal to net consequences even in the
catastrophic cases,'" ° or one might equally and oppositely try to set
aside the traditional idea of human and other moral rights in favor of
some sort of general utilitarian calculus.'
Neither of these alternatives would, however, really solve the
problem. We can calmly invite moral catastrophe only on the basis
of a logic that is difficult, at best, to publicly share and examine.
And on the other hand, even the most thorough sort of
consequentialism must involve considerations that look very much
like moral rights: What sorts of beings count? Do we all count
equally? We have seen how normative utilitarianism is driven in the
direction of recognizing some sorts of moral rights in practice, as
much to avoid unattractive outcomes as for sheer convenience in
application. 5 z But we need some theory of when to endorse such
"intuitive" rights, and what particular form they should take.
Moving in from the other direction, we might formulate
unusually detailed and specific moral rights that try to limit their own
scope by taking account of moral disasters, the motivation of the
actor, moral character, and various particular circumstances.'53 Thus
we might conceivably endorse a moral rule that by its own terms
allows lying, say, when the alternative would be nightmarish, when
the lie actually reflects good character, when the lie builds good
character in another or prevents further lies, when the truth is not
really expected or is under attack by our audience, and so on. 54
What we must do at this point is to offer some theory of where these
more narrowly crafted, less risky rights are coming from. Are they
150. John Finnis, Moral Absolutes. Tradition, Revision, and Truth (CUA Press,
1991).
151. See, unequivocally and classically, Jeremy Bentham, The Utilitarians." An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Doubleday, 1961). For
an instance of contemporary utilitarianism, see, for example, J.J.C. Smart &
Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism. For and Against 3 (Cambridge U Press, 1973).
152. See notes 89-92 and accompanying text. For further discussion, see, for
example, R. George Wright, What's Gone Wrong With Legal Theory?: The Three
Faces of Our Split Personality 33 Wake Forest L Rev 371, 383 (1998).
153. Rescher, Objectivity at 167 (cited in note 133).
154. Id.
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not just ad hoc reflections of unsystematized moral sentiments? Are
they not still just approximations? Must we not revise them to take
account of new contingencies we had not previously thought of?.
Won't the most unimpeachable narrow rules also be the most
uninformative; for example, "Don't lie to anyone for frivolous
reasons?"
The golden spike problem, or something equally severe, thus
remains a problem for anyone who does not reject normative ethics
entirely.'55 Until we solve this problem, however, we will not have a
genuinely unified and complete theory of rights, or of the place of
rights in a broader normative ethical system.'56
155. One could, certainly, solve the problem at a merely verbal level by seeking
to "maximize" both consequential value and nonconsequential values at stake in
any given case. See Garth L. Hallett, Greater Good at 2 (cited in note 130). It
remains to be seen how this would be worked out. For some relevant discussion,
see Robert Audi, Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character 294-95 (Oxford U
Press, 1997).
156. A possible first step would be to apply the idea of "reflective equilibrium"
developed by writers such as John Rawls and Norman Daniels. See, for example,
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 20, 48 (Belknap Press of Harv U Press, 1971);
Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics 76
J Phil 256 (1979). Another possible first step would be to appeal somehow to the
idea of Aristotelian phronesis or practical wisdom. See Robert Audi, Moral
Knowledge at 294 (cited in note 155). For background, see, for example, Sarah
Broadie, Ethics With Aristotle ch 4 (Oxford U Press, 1991); C.D.C. Reeve,
Practices of Reason: Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics ch 2 (Clarendon Press, 1995).
For background discussion of the controversial relationship between utility and
rights see, for example, Ian Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory ch 6
(Cambridge U Press, 1986) (arguing that the alleged gulf between liberal individual
rights theory and utilitarianism is largely illusory); Alan Ryan, ed, The Idea of
Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin 77 (Oxford U Press, 1979)
(emphasizing the disjunction between rights theory and utilitarianism); R.G. Frey,
ed, Utility and Rights (U of Minn Press, 1984); Jeremy Waldron, ed, Utility and
Rights in Theories of Rights 110 (Oxford U Press, 1984); David Lyons, Human
Rights and the General Welfare 6 Phil & Pub Aff 113 (1977); Gewirth, Human
Rights at ch 5 (cited in note 142).

